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Abstract
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who
searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the
workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who
often obtain relevant information from the parties being regulated through a process of delegation. A
fundamental tension underlying delegation is the fact that the agent’s interests will typically differ –
potentially significantly – from the interests of the principal, and as a result the agent may propose
solutions based on their own incentives that are inefficient for the principal. A basic problem, therefore,
is to design mechanisms by which the principal can constrain the set of proposals they are willing to
accept from the agent, to ensure a certain level of quality for the principal from the proposed solution.
In this work, we investigate how much the principal loses – quantitatively, in terms of the objective
they are trying to optimize – when they delegate to an agent. We develop a methodology for bounding this
loss of efficiency, and show that in a very general model of delegation, there is a family of mechanisms
achieving a universal bound on the ratio between the quality of the solution obtained through delegation
and the quality the principal could obtain in an idealized benchmark where they searched for a solution
themself. Moreover, it is possible to achieve such bounds through mechanisms with a natural threshold
structure, which are thus structurally simpler than the optimal mechanisms typically considered in the
literature on delegation. At the heart of our framework is an unexpected connection between delegation
and the analysis of prophet inequalities, which we leverage to provide bounds on the behavior of our
delegation mechanisms.
1 Introduction
There are many settings in which a decision-maker is faced with a difficult problem that they cannot solve on
their own, and so they instead approach it in two steps: they first delegate the search for possible solutions
to an agent who is able to invest more time in the process, and then they evaluate the solution(s) that the
agent proposes. One concrete example arises in organizations or firms, where the management may delegate
the search for solutions to a division that reports to them, ultimately making a decision on the solution that
is proposed by the division (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Armstrong and Vickers, 2010; Li et al., 2017). A
second example arises in regulation, where a governmental agency needs to decide whether there is a way to
structure a proposed corporate merger in a way that is compatible with regulatory guidelines; the companies
seeking to merge study possible ways of structuring the merger, propose one or more to the regulator, and
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seek the regulator’s approval. In this way, the search over structures for the merger has implicitly been
delegated from the regulator to the companies, with the regulator retaining decision-making control over
the the proposed solution (Farrell and Katz, 2006; Nocke and Whinston, 2010). A similar scenario could be
described for regulation in other settings, where a company may be searching over possible solutions that
comply with environmental law, employment law, or other guidelines.
The interesting tension in all these situations is that the decision-maker who delegates the task (hence-
forth referred to as the “principal”) has a particular objective function that they are seeking to optimize; but
the agent who actually performs the task might have interests that are not directly aligned with the prin-
cipal’s. For example, in the regulatory context, the regulator (acting as principal) may reasonably suspect
that a merger proposed by a set of companies (acting as the agent) will be structured in a way that strongly
benefits the companies, even if other feasible structures would have been better for the market or for society
as a whole. Similarly, a group within an organization tasked with solving a problem may well preferentially
search for a solution that benefits them in particular. Given this natural set of incentives, how should the
principal structure the delegation to the agent so as to ensure that the solution the agent proposes performs
well under the principal’s own objective function?
A rich literature has developed in economics around the formalization and analysis of delegation, focus-
ing on this tension between the conflicting objectives of the principal and the agent; see Holmstrom (1977,
1984) for influential early research, and Alonso and Matouschek (2008); Armstrong and Vickers (2010);
Amador and Bagwell (2013); Ambrus and Egorov (2017) for recent work. A dominant theme in this line of
work is that the principal does not offer monetary compensation to the agent as a way of favoring certain
proposed solutions over others (though see Krishna and Morgan (2008)); this is consistent with the moti-
vating applications, in which for example regulators in many contexts can accept or reject proposals from
companies, but cannot selectively offer varying amounts of compensation to these companies based on the
content of the proposal. This lack of monetary transfers between the parties imparts a fundamental structure
to the problem, in which the principal can simply define a mechanism implicitly specifying the subset of all
“eligible” proposals that they are willing to accept, and the agent is then incentivized to search for solutions
that are good for them but that also lie in this eligible set. A long line of work has gone into determining the
structure of eligible sets that produce optimal mechanisms for the principal, yielding constructions that are
often quite intricate (Alonso and Matouschek, 2008; Armstrong and Vickers, 2010; Melumad and Shibano,
1991).
The Present Work Given how broadly delegation is used across a range of contexts, it is interesting to
consider how precarious a process it is — the principal is ceding control of their search problem to an agent
whose interests might be completely misaligned with their own, and the only leverage the principal has
is to accept or reject the solution that is eventually proposed. How much does the principal give up —
quantitatively, measured in terms of the objective they are trying to optimize — when they delegate to an
agent? Is there some robust, intrinsic reason why things don’t turn out as badly as we might fear? And how
do the answers to these questions depend on what the principal is actually able to observe about the agent’s
solution — including how much effort the agent put into finding the solution, and how good it is not just for
the principal but also for the agent?
In their most natural formulation, these are inherently comparative questions, since they seek to relate
the solution quality obtained through delegation to the solution quality in an alternate, ideal setting where
delegation was not necessary. As such, they address an issue fundamentally distinct from the primary focus
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of the existing literature on delegation, which as noted above has centered on characterizing mechanisms
that produce optimal delegation for the principal, without this type of comparative evaluation.
There is a natural benchmark to use for our comparison: we could measure the quality of the outcome
under delegation versus the quality of the solution that the principal could obtain were they to perform the
search task themself, investing the same level of effort in the search that the agent does. Now, there are many
settings where it may be too costly or otherwise infeasible for the principal to actually conduct this search,
but this benchmark nonetheless provides a conceptual reference point to make clear how much payoff to
the principal is lost through delegation. In this sense, it plays the role of an optimal point of comparison,
much like the role of the intractable optimum in an approximation algorithm or the societal optimum in a
price-of-anarchy analysis.
In this paper we develop a methodology to bound the performance of delegated search, relative to the
benchmark in which the principal searches for a solution on their own. Our methodology builds on a set
of links that we identify between bounds on delegated search and the analysis of some fundamental models
of decision-making under uncertainty — in particular, a surprisingly strong connection between delegated
search and bounds on prophet inequalities. The connections between these formalisms turn out be quite
natural and useful, but to our knowledge they have not been previously identified in either of the literatures
on delegated search or on prophet inequalities. This connection not only provides bounds on the quality of
delegated solutions relative to an ideal benchmark; it also shows that strong bounds can be obtained using
eligible sets that are structurally very simple — in a number of cases defined simply by a carefully chosen
threshold rule — and hence in contrast with the complex constructions associated with optimal mechanisms.
1.1 Overview of Models
A Distributional Model We begin by describing the models in which we perform our analysis. Our
main model, which is essentially the one considered in Armstrong and Vickers (2010), has the principal and
the agent agree that the agent will consider n candidate solutions and propose one to the principal; n thus
represents the level of effort that the agent commits to the problem. The principal will only see the solution
that is proposed, not the other n − 1 that the agent also considers.
What does it means for the agent to consider a candidate solution? We assume that the solutions belong
to an abstract space Ω with a probability measure on it, and the agent’s search for a solution consists of
performing n independent and identically distributed draws from Ω, resulting in a set of candidate solutions
ω1, ω2, . . . , ωn ∈ Ω.
1 Each solution ωi drawn by the agent has a quality for the principal, denoted x(ωi), and
a possibly different quality for the agent, denoted y(ωi). The agent selects one of its candidate solutions, say
ωi, to present to the principal. (Below, we will discuss the contrast between the model in which the principal
is able to determine both x(ωi) and y(ωi) — the value to both the agent and themself — for the proposed
solution, and the model in which the principal is only able to determine x(ωi).)
Now, if the principal imposed no constraint on the agent’s behavior, then the agent would simply choose
the solution ωi that maximizes y(ωi), and the principal would receive whatever corresponding x(ωi) value
resulted from this choice. To improve on this, the principal could specify at the outset that they will only
accept ω values that satisfy some predicate on x(ωi) and (in the case that they can determine it) y(ωi); we
will refer to the set of all ω satisfying the principal’s predicate as the eligible set of solutions. It is thus
1Later we will also consider the case in which different draws by the agent can come from different probability measures on Ω;
for example, this can model the case in which the agent is a group of n employees in an organization, and the ith solution is drawn
by the ith agent, who may have a different distribution over solutions from the jth agent.
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in the agent’s interest to propose a solution belonging to the eligible set; we ask whether one can design
eligible sets that provide provable bounds on the expected quality of the solution to the principal, relative to
the scenario in which the principal simply were to draw n times from Ω and select the sampled solution ω
with maximum x(ω).
A Binary Model In our first, distributional model, the agent draws a set of candidate solutions ω1, . . . , ωn
that the principal cannot observe, and then must choose one to present to the principal. This models a
setting in which the agent explores a design space and cannot fully anticipate which ωi it will encounter
until it begins this exploration. But we can also imagine settings where the principal and agent both know
that the set of potential options comes from a large discrete set ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm, and the only question is
which of these options is actually feasible to implement. For example, there may be m standard ways of
structuring a merger in a given industry, and the only question is which are possible for the companies in
question.
Wemodel this version with publicly known binary options as follows. There is a set of options ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm,
and for each i, there is a known probability pi > 0 such that option ωi is feasible with probability pi, and
infeasible otherwise. If option ωi turns out to be feasible, then it produces a known payoff of x(ωi) for the
principal and a known payoff y(ωi) for the agent; if it turns out to be infeasible, then it produces a payoff of
0 for both. The only way to evaluate the feasibility of option ωi is to pay a cost of ci to investigate it.
The principal delegates to the agent the task of proposing a feasible option, which the principal can either
accept or reject. The principal will not be able to see which options the agent decides to pay to evaluate
as part of this task, but again the principal can specify a predicate defining the eligible subset of ωi that
they will accept. Subject to this constraint, the agent then must decide how to evaluate options in a way
that maximizes its own benefit y(ωi) from the option ωi it proposes, minus the evaluation cost. Here too
we evaluate the principal’s payoff relative to the scenario in which they performed the evaluation of options
themself. We also consider an extension of this model in which there is a budget of n < m on the number
of options that the agent can evaluate — a constraint analogous to the bound on the number of samples the
agent can evaluate in our first distributional model.
1.2 Overview of Results
We begin by showing that for an arbitrary instance of the distributional model, there is a mechanism the
principal can specify to the agent so that the principal’s expected payoff from delegation is within a factor of
2 of the expected payoff they’d receive were they able to search for the solution by themself. (If the principal
were to search by themself, they would examine n candidate solutions and choose the one that was best for
them.) This mechanism only requires knowledge of the principal’s x(ωi) values, not the agent’s y(ωi) values,
and it has a very simple structure: depending on the distribution of values, it can be written as a threshold
rule with either a weak threshold, in which the principal only accepts proposals ω for which x(ω) ≥ θ for
some θ, or a strict threshold, in which the principal only accepts proposals ω for which x(ω) > θ for some
θ. In the case when x(ω) and y(ω) are distributed independently with no point masses, the factor of 2 in this
bound can be improved to e/(e − 1).
There are several things worth remarking on about this result. First, the fact that arbitrary instances of
the problem have mechanisms providing provable guarantees of this form suggests a qualitative argument
for the robustness of delegation: no matter how misaligned the agent’s interests are, the principal can ensure
an absolute bound on how much is lost in the quality of the solution. Second, the mechanism that achieves
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this bound is very simple and detail-free, consisting of just a (weak or strict) threshold on the quality of the
solution for the principal. And third, the mechanism requires knowledge of n (the number of samples drawn
by the agents) but not the values y(ω). In this sense, it suggests that it is more important for the principal
to know how much effort the agent has spent on the search (via n) than to know how good the proposed
solution is for the agent (via y(ω)).
A connection to prophet inequalities These results on threshold mechanisms and their guarantees fol-
low from a general result at the heart of our analysis — a close connection between bounds for delegated
search and prophet inequalities. Prophet inequalities are guarantees for the following type of decision under
uncertainty: we see a sequence of values s1, s2, . . . , sn in order, with si drawn from a distribution S i, and
when we see the value si we must irrevocably decide whether to stop and accept si, or continue (in the hope
of finding a better value in the future). Research on prophet inequalities has established the non-trivial fact
that it is possible to design rules whose expected payoff comes within a constant fraction of the maximum
achievable by a decision-maker who could see all the realized values s1, s2, . . . , sn in advance.
Prophet inequalities tend to be established by designing carefully constructed threshold rules, in which
the decision-maker accepts si if and only if si (weakly or strictly) exceeds a specified threshold θi that
can depend on the position i. The key component of our analysis is to establish a close, though subtle,
technical connection between delegated search and prophet inequalities: roughly speaking, the sequence
of values x(ω1), x(ω2), . . . , x(ωn) sampled by the agent from the set of possible solutions Ω plays the role
of the process generating s1, s2, . . . , sn; and the principal and the agent jointly — through the principal’s
specification of the threshold and the agent’s incentive to obey it — play the role of the decision-maker who
uses a threshold rule for deciding when to stop. Again, the notion of “stopping” here is a bit oblique, since
the principal never sees the full sequence x(ω1), x(ω2), . . . , x(ωn) that the agent generates; this is the sense
in which the stopping rule is jointly constructed by the behavior of the principal and the agent together.
Stronger bounds for independent values Using this connection to threshold rules for prophet inequali-
ties, we can design a much more powerful policy for the principal in the case when the values of x(ω) and
y(ω) on a draw ω from Ω are distributed independently, and when the principal can see both x(ωi) and y(ωi)
(rather than only x(ωi)) in the solution ωi proposed by the agent.
To do this, we begin with a stopping rule from the prophet inequality literature achieving an expected
payoff that is at least 0.745 times the optimum when the distributions of the si values are independent
and identically distributed (Abolhassani et al., 2017; Correa et al., 2017; Hill and Kertz, 1982; Kertz, 1986).
This stopping rule uses a sequence of thresholds θi that decrease with i, making the decision-maker naturally
more prone to stop and accept a value as the end of the sequence nears — effectively following the idea that
one should only accept a value early if it’s very good.
In the context of delegated search when the principal can observe both x(ωi) and y(ωi) for a proposed
solution ωi, a related concept is useful for designing mechanisms: the principal should only accept a solution
ωi with y(ωi) very large if x(ωi) is very large as well. The analogy between requiring strong incentive to
accept a value with large y(ωi) in delegated search and requiring strong incentive to accept a value early
in the sequence in the prophet inequality context can be made precise, and it reveals that the y(ωi) values
(over the set of candidate solutions considered by the agent) can be used as a kind of “continuous time”
parameter for deriving a threshold: if we think of the candidate solution ωi as arriving at continuous time
y(ωi), then we can derive a threshold function θ(·) in which the principal only accepts ωi if x(ωi) (weakly
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or strictly) exceeds θ(y(ωi)).
2 In this sense, the principal and agent again jointly construct the stopping
rule, with the agent’s payoff providing a type of synthetic temporal ordering that is useful in formulating a
threshold policy.
Bounds for the binary model We also use the connection to prophet inequalities to derive bounds for
the binary model, where the agent pays to evaluate the feasibility of pairs from a known list of options
ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm. Here too the principal can designate a predefined eligible set of proposals so that the mech-
anism that accepts any eligible proposed ωi yields an expected payoff that is within a factor of two of the
benchmark in which the principal performs the search on their own. However, the eligibility criterion in this
case is subtler: it depends not only on the principal’s assessment of the proposal’s quality, x(ωi), but also on
the cost ci and the a priori probability of feasibility, pi.
To establish this bound, we draw on both prophet inequality bounds and on work of Kleinberg et al.
(2016) for the box problem (Weitzman, 1979); by considering an ordering of the options by the notion of
reservation price (or, equivalently, strike price) defined in those works, we can establish a provable guarantee
that correctly handles not only the payoff arising from the x(ωi) and y(ωi) values but also the cost incurred
by the agent in evaluating the feasibility of options.
Finally, we derive similar bounds in the more general case where the agent also has a budget of n < m on
the number of options they can evaluate. The approach using reservation prices does not directly extend to
this case, but we show that by combining the approach of Kleinberg et al. (2016) with bounds for stochastic
optimization due to Asadpour and Nazerzadeh (2016), we can obtain more general bounds for a budgeted
variant of the box problem that contains the case we need for our delegated search guarantee.
We note that it would be a natural open question to consider a variant of the problem combining char-
acteristics of the two main versions we consider here: as in the distributional model, the agent performs
independent draws from a space Ω; but as in the binary model, the agent does not have a fixed bound n on
the number of allowed draws, instead incurring a cost to perform each draw that must be traded off against
the eventual payoff from the sample selected.
1.3 Further Discussion of Related Work on Delegation
The theory of delegation in the economics literature is often viewed as beginning with Bengt Holmstrom’s
Ph.D. thesis (Holmstrom, 1977, 1984); this work articulates the basic tension that we see in these mod-
els, between allowing an agent to optimize in a large space and restricting the agent’s freedom of action
to prevent them from pursuing their own objectives too aggressively. Holmstrom’s model considered dele-
gating an optimization problem over an interval, and a sequence of subsequent papers analyzed the case in
which the agent optimizes over a continuum (Alonso and Matouschek, 2008; Melumad and Shibano, 1991).
Armstrong and Vickers (2010) propose a model that is very close to what we consider here, where the opti-
mization takes place over a discrete set that the agent samples from an underlying distribution. By way of
comparison between our work and that of Armstrong and Vickers (2010), we noted the key contrast earlier
in this section: their paper is largely devoted to identifying cases of the delegated search problem for which
the structure of the optimal mechanism can be identified, whereas we focus on bounding the inefficiency of
delegated search relative to a benchmark in which the principal performs the task themself. It is through our
emphasis on these types of bounds that we develop the connection to the analysis of prophet inequalities.
2We observe that this continuous time defined by the y(ωi) runs “in reverse,” in the sense that large values of y(ωi), like small
values of time, place stricter demands on the x(ωi) values that can be accepted.
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A distinct line of work in delegation relaxes the constraint that the principal may only allow or forbid
each proposed solution, and instead allows the principal to add arbitrary amounts of cost to certain subsets
of proposed solutions (Athey et al., 2004; Amador and Bagwell, 2013; Ambrus and Egorov, 2017). One of
the key motivations for such a condition is to model the strategic role of bureaucracy within an organization:
if management wants to dissuade units within the organization from proposing certain types of solutions,
they can use bureaucratic measures (requiring more extensive justifications and processes) that make these
solutions selectively more costly without explicitly forbidding them, and without engaging in explicit mon-
etary transfers. Ambrus and Egorov (2017) propose a model in which such selective cost increases are in
fact part of the optimal delegation scheme.
Finally, a recent working paper by Khodabakhsh et al. (2018) studies algorithmic delegation in a much
more general setting, in which a principal must choose an action and she delegates this choice to an agent
who is informed of the state of the world. The principal’s and agent’s preferences over actions in every state
of the world may differ, leading to a problem of designating a set of eligible actions among which the agent
may choose, so as to maximize the principal’s utility when the agent chooses selfishly among the eligible
actions. This problem is shown to be computationally hard in general, but a simple threshold policy is shown
to achieve a 2-approximation to the optimal mechanism under a “negative bias” condition. Such a result is
in the same spirit as our 2-approximation result for threshold rules, though the hypothesis under which their
result holds, and the method of proof, are quite different.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We begin by making the precise the way in which the principal and the agent interact, resulting in the
principal’s selection of (at most) one element from a set Ω of potential solutions. There are functions
x : Ω → R and y : Ω → R such that if ω ∈ Ω is selected, then the principal’s utility is x(ω) and the agent’s
utility is y(ω). To formalize the possibility that the principal selects no solution (i.e., perpetuating the status
quo) we identify this possiblity with a special “null outcome”, denoted ⊥, and we extend the utility functions
from Ω to Ω+
∆
= Ω ∪ {⊥} by setting x(⊥) = y(⊥) = 0.
The set Ω is a probability space, with probability measure µ, and the agent has the power to draw
independent samples from Ω according to µ. The principal, on the other hand, can neither draw samples
from Ω nor directly observe the outcome of the agent’s sampling; she must rely on her interaction with the
agent to arrive at a selected element of Ω.3
Before formalizing our model of interaction, it is useful to first note some of the ways in which our basic
model can be generalized or specialized.
• We will initially consider the case of a single probability measure µ on Ω, but it is also useful to
consider cases in which there are multiple probability measures µ1, µ2, . . . , µm on Ω, and the agent has
the power to draw independent samples from any of these distributions.
• We will generally assume there is a sampling budget of n on the number of samples that the agent can
draw. In some of our models, we will also introduce a sampling cost c ≥ 0 for each draw by the agent
— or in the case of multiple probability measures, a cost ci ≥ 0 for sampling from µi.
3Throughout this paper we use feminine pronouns for the principal and masculine pronouns for the agents.
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• We consider both the full-information case — in which the principal knows both the functions x :
Ω → R and y : Ω → R, and hence can evaluate the utility of a solution ω to both herself and to the
agent — and the limited-information case, in which the principal only knows her own utility function
x.
• The functions x : Ω→ R and y : Ω→ R define random variables on Ω, and we consider both the case
in which they can be arbitrary non-negative functions, and the case of independent utilities, when they
are independent random variables.
In a later section, we will specialize the formalism to the binary model discussed in Section 1, in which
each distribution µi is supported on a two-element set {ω0i, ω1i} such that (x(ω0i), y(ω0i)) = (0, 0). In this
case we will let (xi, yi) denote the pair (x(ω1i), y(ω1i)). The binary model captures a setting in which the
feasibility of the ith solution is unknown until the agent investigates it, but the value of the solution to both
parties (if feasible) is known a priori.
2.1 A General Definition of Mechanisms for the Principal and Agent
Let us now formalize how the principal and the agent interact, resulting in the principal’s selection of a
solution. Thus far, our discussion in Section 1 has focused on interactions of a very structured form: the
agent draws a set of samples from Ω; the agent selects one of these samples to present to the principal; and
the principal accepts or rejects it. But it would be useful to be able to consider more general formulations for
their allowed interactions, within which the transmission of a single proposal from the agent to the principal
is a particular special case.
To do this, we begin by defining a mechanism as follows. A mechanism M = (Σ, g) defines a set of
signals, Σ, that the agent may send, and an allocation function g : Σ → Ω+ that specifies which solution
the principal will choose given the agent’s signal. In such a mechanism, a strategy for the agent is specified
by a mapping σ : Ω∗ → Σ, where Ω∗ denotes the set of finite sequences over Ω, such that σ(ω1, . . . , ωn)
represents the signal the agent sends if he sampled n solutions and observed the sequence ω1, . . . , ωn.
Suppose the agent observes sequence ω1, . . . , ωn and sends signal σ, resulting in outcome ω = g(σ).
In this case, the principal’s and agent’s utilities are x(ω) and y(ω), respectively, if ω ∈ {ω1, . . . , ωn} ∪ {⊥}.
Otherwise the principal’s utility is 0 and the agent’s is −1. In other words, we assume that if the mechanism
results in the principal selecting a solution that was never sampled by the agent, that solution cannot be
adopted. Instead the status quo is preserved and the agent suffers a penalty. This assumption is consistent
with our assumption that the principal lacks the power to directly search for solutions herself; she can only
adopt solutions that the agent has discovered.
In models with costly sampling, the specification of an agent’s strategy must also include a sequential
policy pi for deciding which sample (if any) to observe next, given the set of samples already observed.
The principal’s and agent’s utilities are both diminished by the sum of costs ci for the samples i that the
agent observed when running policy pi. (We deduct this sum from the principal’s utility because we think
of the cost incurred by the agent in searching for a solution as a kind of “waste” that the principal views as
detracting from the overall utility.)
Under our definition of mechanisms, the sequence of solutions sampled by the agent leads to a signal (via
the agent’s strategy σ), and this signal leads to a solution in Ω+ (via the principal’s allocation function g).
Composing these two functions, we get a mapping from the agent’s sampled solutions to a single solution:
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Definition 1 (interim allocation function). If M is a mechanism and σ is an agent’s strategy, the interim
allocation function of the pair (M, σ) is the mapping fM,σ : Ω
∗ → Ω+ obtained by composing the strategy σ
with the allocation function g. In other words, fM,σ(ω1, . . . , ωn) is the outcome resulting from mechanism
M, when the agent draws sample sequence (ω1, . . . , ωn) and plays according to σ.
2.2 Single Proposal Mechanisms
We now show that there is a sense in which it is without loss of generality to focus on interactions in which
the agent proposes a single solution from among the ones they sampled, and the principal either accepts or
rejects it. To do this, we define a simple type of mechanism called a single proposal mechanism, and we
show in Lemma 1 below that any other mechanism can be simulated by a single proposal mechanism.
Definition 2. A single-proposal mechanism with eligible set R ⊆ Ω is a mechanism in which the agent
proposes one outcome, and the mechanism accepts this proposal if and only if it belongs to R. More formally,
M = (Σ, g) is a single-proposal mechanism with eligible set R if Σ = Ω+ and g restricts to the identity
function on R and the constant function ω 7→ ⊥ on Ω+ \ R.
Lemma 1. If M is any mechanism and σ is any strategy constituting a best response to M, then there exists
a single proposal mechanism M′ and a best response σ′ to M′, such that the interim allocation functions
fM,σ and fM′,σ′ are identical.
Proof. Let R be the range of the interim allocation function fM,σ, i.e. the set of all possible outcomes of
M, other than ⊥, when the agent acts according to σ. Define M′ to be the single-proposal mechanism with
eligible set R. Let σ′ be the strategy in which the agent observes his tuple of samples, ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn),
and chooses strategy σ′(ω) = g(σ(ω)). By construction the interim allocation functions fM,σ and fM′,σ′
are identical. To prove that σ′ is a best response to M′, consider any ω ∈ Ωn and any ν , σ′(ω). Let
y0 = y(g
′(σ′(ω))) denote the agent’s utility when playing according to σ′; note that y0 ≥ 0. We wish to
show that the agent cannot benefit by playing ν instead, i.e.
y(g′(ν)) ≤ y0. (1)
If ν < R then g′(ν) = ⊥ which implies (1) since y0 ≥ 0. If ν ∈ R then ν = g(σ˜) for some σ˜ ∈ Σ. Now (1)
follows because strategy σ is a best response for mechanism M, and y(g′(ν)) denotes the agent’s utility when
playing strategy σ˜ in M whereas y0 denotes his utility when playing σ. 
3 Analyzing Delegated Search Via Prophet Inequalities
In this section we develop a formal link between delegated search mechanisms and prophet inequalities. It
turns out that the relevant prophet inequalities involve random variables arriving at discrete points in contin-
uous time, rather than the usual assumption that they arrive at time points 1, 2, . . . , n. Accordingly, we will
begin by explaining the formal model of continuous-time prophet inequalities in Section 3.1 below. Then in
Section 3.2 we explain the reduction from delegated search (in the distributional model) to continuous-time
prophet inequalities.
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3.1 Continuous-time prophet inequalities
In this section we will be concerned with problems which involve designing a selection rule to choose (at
most) one element from a random finite set of pairs (xi, ti) ∈ R+ × [0, 1], with the goal of maximizing the
expected x-coordinate of the chosen element. The t-coordinate is thought of as a time coordinate, and we
will generally (but not exclusively) be concerned with selection rules that make their choice without looking
into the future, as is ordinarily the case in the analysis of prophet inequalities.
Definition 3 (selection rules). A selection rule is a function ρ from finite subsets of R+ × [0, 1] to the set
(R+ × [0, 1]) ∪ {⊥}, with the property that ρ(S ) ∈ S ∪ {⊥} for every S .
A stopping rule is a selection rule that chooses element (x, t) from set S without looking at the set of
elements whose time coordinate is greater than t. Formally, ρ is a stopping rule if it satisfies the following
property: for any (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0, 1] and any two sets S , S
′ such that S ∩ (R+ × [0, t]) = S
′ ∩ (R+ × [0, t]),
we have
ρ(S ) = (x, t) ⇐⇒ ρ(S ′) = (x, t).
An oblivious stopping rule with eligible set Q ⊆ R+ × [0, 1] is a stopping rule ρQ such that for every S ,
ρQ(S ) is an earliest element of S ∩ Q (i.e., an element of that set with minimum t coordinate) or ρQ(S ) = ⊥
if S ∩ Q is empty.
A threshold stopping rule with threshold θ is an oblivious stopping rule whose eligible set is of the form
(θ,∞) × [0, 1] or [θ,∞) × [0, 1].
Definition 4 (CTSPs and prophet inequalities). A continuous-time selection problem (CTSP) is an ordered
pair (D ,R) where D is a set of probability distributions over finite subsets of R+ × [0, 1], and R is a set of
selection rules.
A CTSP (D ,R) satisfies a prophet inequality with factor α if it is the case that for every D ∈ D there
exists some ρ ∈ R such that
ES∼D[Xρ(S )] ≥ α · ES∼D[X∗(S )].
Here the random variable Xρ(S ) is defined by specifying that if ρ(S ) = (x, t) then Xρ(S ) = x, and if ρ(S ) = ⊥
then Xρ(S ) = 0. The random variable X∗(S ) is defined to be max{x|(x, t) ∈ S }.
We now present the prophet inequalities we will use in this work. To state them, we define the following
families of stopping rules and distributions on subsets of R+ × [0, 1].
• Robliv is the family of oblivious stopping rules.
• Rthresh is the family of threshold stopping rules.
• Dind is the family of random sets whose elements are obtained by sampling independently from n
joint distributions. In other words, a distribution D ∈ Dind is specified by giving a positive number
n, a tuple of joint distributions D1, . . . ,Dn on R+ × [0, 1], and defining D to be the distribution on
n-element sets obtained by drawing one sample independently from each of D1, . . . ,Dn.
• Diid,n is the family of random sets whose n elements are i.i.d. samples from an atomless distribution
with x and t independent, i.e. a distribution on R+× [0, 1] which is a product of atomless distributions.
• Diid is the union of Diid,n over all n ≥ 1.
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Our first prophet inequality is Samuel-Cahn’s (1984) famous prophet inequality for threshold stopping
rules.
Theorem 1. (Samuel-Cahn (1984)) There is a prophet inequality with factor 1
2
for (Dind, Rthresh).
The second is an improved prophet inequality for threshold stopping rules when samples are drawn i.i.d.
from atomless product distributions; it can be derived as a corollary of either (Ehsani et al., 2018, Theorem
19) or (Correa et al., 2017, Corollary 2.2).
Theorem 2. (Correa et al. (2017); Ehsani et al. (2018)) There is a prophet inequality with factor 1 − 1
e
for
(Diid, Rthresh).
Our third prophet inequality again pertains to the case when samples are drawn i.i.d. from atomless
product distributions, but it allows for oblivious stopping rules rather than threshold stopping rules. The
discrete-time counterpart to this prophet inequality can be found in Hill and Kertz (1982); Kertz (1986);
Correa et al. (2017).
Theorem 3. Let α = 0.745 . . . be the solution to
∫ 1
0
(
y − y ln y + 1 − 1
α
)−1
dy = 1. There is a prophet
inequality with factor (1 − 6
n
)α for (Diid,n, Robliv).
Since the distincton between discrete time and continuous time is immaterial from the standpoint of
analyzing threshold stopping rules, the first two of these theorems are equivalent to the existing results for
discrete-time prophet inequalities that we have cited before the theorem statements. On the other hand,
because oblivious stopping rules are less powerful than general stopping rules, the third theorem is not an
immediate consequence of the corresponding discrete-time prophet inequality. Proofs of all three theorems
are included in Appendix A; since Theorem 3 is the only novel result among the three theorems, the proofs
of the other two are included only for the purpose of making our paper self-contained.
To complete this section, we will describe the stopping rules which achieve the bounds stated in the
three prophet inequalities above.
When the points {(xi, ti)}
n
i=1
are independent but not necessarily identically distributed, choose threshold
θ1/2 to be the median of the distribution of max{xi}. In other words, θ1/2 is defined such that the events
max{x1, . . . , xn} > θ1/2 and max{x1, . . . , xn} < θ1/2 both have probability at most
1
2
. Consider the threshold
stopping rule that selects the first pair (xi, ti) with xi > θ1/2, and consider the one whose selection criterion
is xi ≥ θ1/2. The proof of Theorem 1 shows that at least one of these two stopping rules fulfills a prophet
inequality with factor 1/2.
When the points {(xi, ti)}
n
i=1
are i.i.d. and the distributions of xi and ti are atomless and independent, with
cumulative distribution functions F andG, respectively, choose threshold θ1−1/e such that Pr(max{x1, . . . , xn} >
θ1−1/e) = 1 −
1
e
. The proof of Theorem 2 shows that the threshold stopping rule that selects the first pair
(xi, ti) such that xi > θ1−1/e fulfills a prophet inequality with factor 1 −
1
e
. Now let βn be the solution to∫ n
0
(
1 + z + βne
z)−1 dz = 1,
and let zn(s) be the solution of the differential equation
dz
ds
= 1 + z + βne
z
with initial condition z(0) = 0. The oblivious stopping rule that accepts the first (xi, ti) such that
1 − F(xi) < z(G(ti))/n
fulfills a prophet inequality with factor (1 − 6
n
)α.
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3.2 Reducing delegated search to prophet inequalities
Although delegated search problems and prophet inequalities appear unrelated at first glance, the tight tech-
nical connection between them is explained by an observation which is extremely natural in hindsight.
Consider a change of variables that maps the agent’s utility y to a point t(y) ∈ [0, 1], where the function t is
monotonically decreasing. In a single proposal mechanism with eligible set R, the agent submits the eligible
proposal (x, y) with the highest y value. Similarly, an oblivious stopping rule with eligible set Q selects the
earliest eligible point (x, t). Since the change of variables t(y) is monotonically decreasing, the two selection
criteria are equivalent! Thus, designing single proposal mechanisms that yield high utility for the principal
is equivalent to designing oblivious stopping rules that yield a high expected value.
In more detail, let t be any continuous, monotonically decreasing bijection from [0,∞) to (0, 1], for
example t(y) = e−y. Under the mapping H : Ω → (R+ × [0, 1]) defined by H(ω) = (x(ω), t(y(ω))), any
distribution on sets of solutions {ω1, . . . , ωn} induces a distribution D on sets of pairs {(x1, t1), . . . , (xn, tn)}.
In particular, our distributional model in which the agent draws n i.i.d. samples from Ω is mapped, under
this correspondence, to a member of the family of distributions Diid,n.
There is also a reverse correspondence from oblivious stopping rules to single proposal mechanisms
and their interim allocation functions. The oblivious stopping rule ρQ with eligible set Q corresponds to the
single proposal mechanism with eligible set H−1(Q). More precisely, if R = H−1(Q) and σ is a best response
to the single proposal mechanism M with eligible set R, then for any sequence of samples ω = (ω1, . . . , ωn),
we have
ρQ(H(ω)) = H( fM,σ(ω)).
In other words, suppose we run the mechanism M; the agent draws a sequence of samples; and we let the
agent choose the best one (for the agent) that belongs to R. This procedure is equivalent to running the
oblivious stopping rule ρQ on the sequence obtained by transforming all of the agents’ samples to points
(xi, ti) = (xi, t(yi)), and selecting the earliest such point (ordered by ti) that belongs to Q. Under this cor-
respondence, threshold stopping rules correspond to single proposal mechanisms in which a solution is
deemed eligible if the principal’s utility exceeds a specified threshold. Note that this subset of single pro-
posal mechanisms can be implemented even when the agent’s utility is unobservable.
Combining these observations with Theorems 1 to 3, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 4. In the distributional model, suppose the agent draws n i.i.d. samples, and let x∗ denote the
utility the principal would attain if she could directly choose her favorite among these n samples.
1. There is always a set X of the form (θ,∞) or [θ,∞) such that a single proposal mechanism with eligible
set {ω | x(ω) ∈ X} ensures that the principal’s expected utility is at least 1
2
E[x∗].
2. If the principal and agent have independent utilities, each drawn from an atomless distribution, then
a single proposal mechanism that accepts any proposal satisfying x(ω) > θ, for a suitable choice of θ,
ensures that the principal’s expected utility is at least
(
1 − 1
e
)
E[x∗].
3. If the principal and agent have independent utilities, each drawn from an atomless distribution, and
the principal can observe the agent’s utility, then a single proposal mechanism that accepts any pro-
posal satisfying x(ω) > θ(y(ω)), for a suitable choice of the function θ(·), ensures that the principal’s
expected utility is at least
(
1 − 6
n
)
αE[x∗], where α is the constant defined in Theorem 3.
In Appendix B we show that the bounds in all three parts of the theorem are tight with respect to the
assumptions made in their respective statements.
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4 Binary outcomes
Recall the binary model from Section 1: The potential solutions come from a large discrete set Ω =
{ω1, ω2, . . . , ωm} and the agent’s role is to explore which of these options are feasible to implement. If
ωi is feasible, it yields utility xi for the principal and yi for the agent — where the pair (xi, yi) is commonly
known to both parties — and if ωi is infeasible it yields zero utility for both parties. To explore the feasibility
of solution ωi the agent must incur a cost of ci ≥ 0, and the probability of success is pi > 0, independently
of the success of other solutions. These quantities ci, pi are again commonly known to both parties. We will
assume that ci ≤ piyi for each solution yi, since otherwise it is against the agent’s self-interest to explore ωi,
even if it were assured that the solution would be adopted if feasible.
4.1 Optimal search policies: Weitzman’s box problem
If the principal were conducting the search by herself (without delegation to an agent), this model would
correspond to a special case of the box problem introduced by Weitzman (1979). The optimal search policy
is simple but surprisingly subtle: it assigns to each option a priority zi satisfying E[(xi−zi)
+] = ci —which in
our case entails setting zi = xi − ci/pi — and then explores options in decreasing order of priority, selecting
the first feasible one in this ordering or stopping when all remaining unexplored options have zi < 0.
Now suppose that the principal instead delegates the search to an agent who bears the cost of exploration,
by running a single-proposal mechanism with eligible set R. Then the agent faces a different instance of the
box problem, in which the set of options is limited to R, and the costs and success probabilities of the
options is the same as before, but the value of option i (if feasible) is yi rather than xi. This means the agent
prioritizes boxes in decreasing order of wi = yi − ci/pi rather than zi = xi − ci/pi, and recommends the first
box in this ordering that is discovered to be feasible.
To summarize, the delegated search problem in the binary model is analogous to Weitzman’s box prob-
lem, but with the important distinction that the searcher (the principal) is not allowed to choose the order
in which to open the boxes. Instead the problem specifies an exogenous ordering of the boxes — corre-
sponding to the agent’s ranking of options by decreasing wi — and the searcher is only free to decide which
boxes in this sequence should be opened and which ones should be skipped, corresponding to the principal’s
problem of choosing the set R. Since this problem may be of independent interest, we devote Theorem 5
below to presenting a solution that always achieves at least half of the expected value of running the optimal
search procedure that is allowed to inspect the boxes in any order it desires. Interestingly, the analysis is
based on prophet inequalities, specifically Theorem 1 and its proof. It implies there is an approximately
optimal mechanism with the following structure. For any half-infinite interval X of the form X = (θ,∞)
or X = [θ,∞), let R(X) = {ωi | zi ∈ X} and define M(X) to be the single-proposal mechanism in which a
proposal ωi is eligible if it is feasible and belongs to R(X).
4.2 The Box Problem with an Exogenous Ordering
In this section we recapitulate some background material about Weitzman’s (1979) box problem. In this
problem4 there are m boxes, each containing an independent random prize. The prize in box i is denoted
vi, and the cost of opening the box is ci. A searcher may open any number of boxes sequentially, or may
4The following description constitutes a special case of Weitzman’s problem. The general case incorporates geometric time
discounting and time delays.
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cease the search at any time and claim a prize from at most one of the open boxes. The problem is to design
an optimal sequential search policy. Weitzman proves that if each box is assigned a priority zi defined by
the equation E[(vi − zi)
+] = ci, then the optimal sequential search policy opens boxes in decreasing order
of priority, stopping at the first time when the highest prize inside an open box exceeds the highest priority
of a closed box, or at the first time when the priority of every remaining closed box is negative, whichever
comes sooner.
Kleinberg et al. (2016) provided a proof of optimality of Weitzman’s procedure in which the priority zi
is interpreted as the “strike price” of a real option with fair value ci. An important quantity in their analysis
is the “covered call value”, which is simply the random variable κi = min{vi, zi}. We restate the following
lemma5 from their work.
Lemma 2. (Kleinberg et al. (2016)) For any sequential search procedure and any box i, let Ai, Bi be the
indicator random variables of the event that the procedure selects box i and the event that it opens box i,
respectively. The inequality
E[Aivi − Bici] ≤ E[Aiκi] (2)
is satisfied by every search procedure, and equality holds if and only if the search procedure is non-exposed,
meaning that Ai = Bi at every sample point where vi > zi.
Corollary 1. For any sequential search procedure, the expected net value of running the procedure (i.e., the
value of the selected box minus the combined cost of opening boxes) is bounded above by the expectation of
the maximum covered call value, i.e.
E

m∑
i=1
Aivi −
m∑
i=1
Bici
 ≤ E

m∑
i=1
Aiκi
 . (3)
The corollary is immediate, by summing inequality (2) over boxes i = 1, . . . ,m.
Now consider the box problem with an exogenous ordering of boxes, where the searcher is limited to
considering the boxes one by one in the specified order, and once she decides to leave a box closed or to
leave the prize within unclaimed, she cannot later return to the box and open it or claim its prize. We define
a type of policy that we call a κ-thresholding policy; the reason for the name will become apparent in the
subsequent Lemma 3, which shows that these policies correspond to a threshold rule applied to the sequence
of covered call values κi.
Definition 5. A κ-thresholding policy for the box problem with exogenous ordering is a policy that operates
as follows. There is a half-infinite interval X = (θ,∞) or X = [θ,∞) called the target interval. The policy
declines to open any box i with zi < X. Otherwise, if zi ∈ X, the policy opens the box and claims the prize
inside if and only if vi ∈ X.
Lemma 3. Every κ-thresholding policy is non-exposed. The expected net value of running a κ-thresholding
policy with target interval X is exactly the same as the expected value selected by the threshold stopping rule
that observes the random sequence κ1, κ2, . . . , κn and selects the first element of this sequence that belongs
to X.
Proof. The policy is non-exposed because zi < X implies Ai = Bi = 0, while zi ∈ X and vi > zi imply
Ai = Bi = 1. Hence the left and right sides of (2) are equal for every box, and the net value of running the
5Lemma 1 of the full version of their paper, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2753858 .
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policy is E
[∑m
i=1 Aiκi
]
, i.e. the expected covered call value of the box the policy selects. By design, the policy
perfectly simulates the threshold stopping rule that chooses the first element of the sequence κ1, . . . , κn that
belongs to X; this is because it selects the first box such that zi and vi both belong to X, which is also the
first box such that κi belongs to X. 
Theorem 5. For every instance of the box problem with exogenous ordering, there is a κ-thresholding policy
whose expected net value is at least half that of Weitzman’s optimal search procedure (which endogenously
selects the ordering of the boxes).
Proof. Lemma 3 reduces the analysis of κ-thresholding policies to a question about prophet inequalities.
In particular, the expected net value of running a κ-thresholding policy is equal to the expected covered
call value of the random element selected from the sequence κ1, . . . , κn by a particular threshold stopping
rule. Since Samuel-Cahn’s (1984) prophet inequality (Theorem 1 above) implies that threshold stopping
rules can always attain at least half the expectation of the maximum random variable in the sequence, it
follows that there is a κ-thresholding policy whose expected net value is at least half the expectation of the
maximum covered call value. Corollary 1 ensures that the latter is an upper bound on the expected net value
of Weitzman’s optimal search procedure. 
4.3 An approximately optimal mechanism
Recall that for a half-infinite interval X = (θ,∞) or X = [θ,∞), the mechanism M(X) is defined to be the
single proposal mechanism whose eligible set consists of solutions ωi that are feasible and satisfy zi ∈ X.
Theorem 6. There exists a choice of X such that the expected net value of mechanism M(X) — i.e., the
principal’s value for adopting the agent’s proposal, if adopted, minus combined cost of all the alternatives
explored — is at least half of the expected net value the principal could achieve by performing the optimal
search herself (without delegation).
Proof. Convert the delegated search problem into a box problem with exogenous order, where the order
is defined by sorting the solutions ω1, . . . , ωm in non-increasing order of the agent’s priority value wi =
yi − ci/pi, and the value vi inside box i is defined to be xi if ωi turns out to be feasible, 0 otherwise.
According to Theorem 5 there exists a choice of X such that the κ-thresholding policy with target set X
attains at least half the expected net value of the optimal search procedure. This thresholding policy goes
through boxes in the given order, i.e. descending wi, and opens only those with zi ∈ X, selecting the first one
such that vi ∈ X. Note that among the boxes which the policy opens, the first one with vi ∈ X is also the
first one corresponding to a feasible ωi. This is because an infeasible ωi has vi = 0 hence vi < X, whereas a
feasible ωi has vi = xi ≥ zi, hence vi ∈ X.
Recall from Section 4.1 that the agent’s best response to mechanism M(X) is to go through the elements
of R(X) in decreasing order of wi, stopping and proposing the first one that is discovered to be feasible. This
is exactly the behavior of the κ-thresholding policy with target set X, as derived in the preceding paragraph.
Hence the mechanism M(X) coupled with the agent’s best response behavior emulates the κ-thresholding
policy which attains at least half the expected net value of the optimal search procedure. 
4.4 Limiting the number of samples
In some cases the number of distinct potential solutions, m, may be prohibitively large, and the agent may
only have the power to explore the feasibility of a limited number of them, n < m. In this case, if the
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principal were to conduct the search autonomously without delegation — subject to the same costs ci and
the same upper bound, n, on the total number of solutions that can be tested for feasibility — it may require a
very complex procedure. Nevertheless, we will provide in this section a simple delegated search mechanism
such that it is easy for the agent to compute a search procedure that is a best response to the mechanism, and
the outcome of running the mechanism with this best response attains at least 1
2
(
1 − 1
e
)
≈ 0.316 of the net
expected value of the (potentially complex) optimal procedure.
The key observation is the following lemma, which provides a useful upper bound on the value of
running the optimal search procedure.
Lemma 4. In the box problem with m > n boxes, if the searcher is limited to open at most n boxes before
claiming a prize, then the expected net value of any search procedure is bounded above by E[maxi∈S κi]
where S is the random set of boxes that the procedure opens.
Proof. Sum up the inequality (2) over all boxes and note that Ai = 0 for i < S , to derive
E

m∑
i=1
Aivi −
m∑
i=1
Bici
 ≤ E

∑
i∈S
Aiκi
 .
The lemma follows by noting that
∑
i∈S Aiκi ≤ maxi∈S κi because
∑
i∈S Ai ≤ 1. 
Lemma 5. There exists a (non-random) set T of cardinality n, such that E[maxi∈T κi] ≥ (1−
1
e
)E[maxi∈S κi],
where S is the random set of solutions explored by the optimal search procedure subject to a contraint of
exploring at most n solutions.
Proof. The problem of adaptively exploring a random set S of at most n solutions to maximize E[maxi∈S κi]
is a special case of the stochastic monotone submodular function maximization problem studied by Asadpour and Nazerzadeh
(2016), in which the role of the monotone submodular function f : Rn+ → R+ is played by the function
f (λ1, . . . , λn) = max{λi}, and role of the matroid constraint is played by the cardinality constraint that at
most n elements may be probed. Theorem 1 of Asadpour and Nazerzadeh (2016), which asserts that the
adaptivity gap of stochastic monotone submodular maximization is e
e−1
, specializes in the present case to
the assertion stated in the lemma. 
Theorem 7. Consider delegated search in the binary model with a constraint that no more than n solutions
can be examined for feasibility. There exists a mechanism that attains at least 1
2
(
1 − 1
e
)
fraction of the
expected net value of the optimal search procedure subject to the same limitation of examining at most n
solutions.
Proof. According to Lemmas 4 and 5, there is an n-element set T ⊆ Ω such that the optimal search pro-
cedure that is limited to explore only solutions in T is able to attain at least 1 − 1
e
fraction of the expected
net value of the optimal search procedure that is limited to examine at most n solutions but can (adaptively)
choose any n elements of Ω during its search. When the set of solutions is restricted to T , the constraint
that at most n solutions can be examined becomes irrelevant since T only has n elements. Thus, Theorem 6
guarantees the existence of a delegated search mechanism that is at least half as good as the optimal search
procedure limited to T , and is consequently at least 1
2
(
1 − 1
e
)
times as good as the optimal search procedure
limited to examine at most n solutions. Moreover, by applying the algorithm in Asadpour and Nazerzadeh
(2016) used to prove Lemma 5, we can implement this policy in polynomial time with a loss of a further
additive ε in the approximation ratio, thus obtaining a bound of 1
2
(
1 − 1
e
− ε
)
efficiently. 
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A Proofs of Prophet Inequalities
In this appendix, we provide proofs of the three main prophet inequalities used in this work, Theorems 1
to 3.
A.1 Threshold stopping rules for independent distributions
In this section we provide a proof of the following theorem from Section 3.1. The theorem (stated in a
different form) was originally proven by Samuel-Cahn (1984); we provide a proof here for the sake of
making the paper self-contained.
Theorem 8. There is a prophet inequality with factor 1
2
for (Dind, Rthresh).
Proof. Consider any distribution D = D1 × · · · × Dn in Dind and let x1, . . . , xn denote independent random
variables representing the x-coordinates of random samples from D1, . . . ,Dn, respectively. Note that the
subscripts on the variables x1, . . . , xn represent the distributions from which they were sampled, not nec-
essarily the order in which they arrive, since their corresponding time coordinates t1, . . . , tn may not be in
ascending order. However, this issue will be immaterial in the proof because our argument is insensitive to
the arrival order of x1, . . . , xn.
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Let x∗ = max{x1, . . . , xn} and choose a threshold θ defining two semi-infinite intervals
X0 = (θ,∞), X1 = [θ,∞)
such that p0
∆
= Pr(x∗ ∈ X0) ≤
1
2
and p1
∆
= Pr(x∗ ∈ X1) ≥
1
2
. Let q be the solution to the equation
qp0 + (1 − q)p1 =
1
2
, and let xτ denote the random variable defined by the following sampling process: first
choose the interval X = X0 with probability q and X = X1 with probability 1 − q. Then apply the threshold
stopping rule with eligible set X × [0, 1] to select an element (x, t) ∈ S and let xτ denote the x-coordinate of
that element. We will prove that Exτ ≥
1
2
Ex∗. Since Exτ is a convex combination of the expected value of
applying the threshold stopping rule with eligible set X0 × [0, 1] and the one with eligible set X1 × [0, 1], it
will follow that the better of those two stopping rules fulfills a prophet inequality with factor 1
2
.
To compare Ex∗ with Exτ we reason as follows. First, we have the following easy upper bound on x∗.
Ex∗ ≤ θ +
n∑
i=1
E(x∗ − θ)
+ (4)
To put a lower bound on xτ, let Yi denote an indicator random variable for the event that {x1, . . . , xn} ∩ X =
{xi}. Note that this event, when it happens, implies that xτ = xi.
Exτ ≥ Pr(xτ ∈ X) · θ +
n∑
i=1
E[Yi(xi − θ)]
=
1
2
θ +
n∑
i=1
Pr(Yi = 1)E[xi − θ |Yi = 1]
because Pr(xτ ∈ X) =
1
2
by our construction of the random set X
=
1
2
θ +
n∑
i=1
Pr({x1, . . . , xn} ∩ X ⊆ {xi}) · E[(xi − θ)
+]
≥
1
2
θ +
n∑
i=1
Pr(x∗ < X) · E[(xi − θ)
+]
=
1
2
θ +
n∑
i=1
E[(xi − θ)
+]
 , (5)
where the last line follows because Pr(x∗ < X) =
1
2
, again by our construction of the random set X. Finally,
the theorem follows by combining (4) with (5). 
A.2 Threshold stopping rules for i.i.d. atomless distributions
This section provides a proof of the following lemma, which is equivalent to Theorem 2 from Section 3.1.
Lemma 6. If X1, X2, . . . , Xn is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, each sampled from an atomless distri-
butions, and τ is a threshold stopping rule such that Pr(τ > 1) = exp(−1/n), then
E[Xτ] ≥
(
1 − 1
e
)
E
[
max
1≤t≤n
Xt
]
. (6)
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Proof. Let X∗ = max1≤t≤n Xt. We have
E[Xτ] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(Xτ > y) dy (7)
E[X∗] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(X∗ > y) dy. (8)
To compare the integrands at any specified y ≥ 0, we consider the cases y < θ and y > θ separately. (The
case y = θ is omitted because it contributes zero to both integrals.) When y < θ the inequality Xτ > y is
satisfied whenever τ ≤ n. Since we are assuming X1, . . . , Xn are identically distributed, and the threshold
stopping rule has the same behavior at every point in time, we have
∀t Pr(τ > t | τ > t − 1) = Pr(τ > 1) = exp(−1/n).
Hence the probability that the stopping rule does not stop at any time t ≤ n is
n∏
t=1
Pr(τ > t | τ > t − 1) = exp(−1/n)n =
1
e
,
and therefore for y < θ,
Pr(Xτ > y) = 1 −
1
e
≥
(
1 − 1
e
)
· Pr(X∗ > y).
Meanwhile, for y > θ, the probability that the stopping rule stops at time t and selects an element of value
greater than y is exp(−1/n)t−1(1 − F(y)). Summing over t, we have
Pr(Xτ > y) =

n∑
t=1
exp
(
− t−1
n
) (1 − F(y)) = (1 − 1e
) (
1 − exp(−1/n)
)−1 (1 − F(y)) .
Using the fact that 1 − exp(−1/n) < 1/n, we find that
Pr(Xτ > y) ≥
(
1 − 1
e
)
n (1 − F(y)) ≥
(
1 − 1
e
)
(1 − F(y))n =
(
1 − 1
e
)
Pr(X∗ > y).
Since we have proven that Pr(Xτ > y) ≥
(
1 − 1
e
)
Pr(X∗ > y) for all y , θ, we may integrate over y and
combine with (7)-(8) to obtain (6). 
A.3 Oblivious stopping rules applied to i.i.d. atomless product distributions
Finally, in this subsection we furnish the proof of Theorem 3 from Section 3.1. The oblivious stopping rule
that fulfills a prophet inequality with factor α − O(
log n
n
) is more complicated than the threshold stopping
rules analyzed earlier. It is defined by first solving a differential equation
dz
ds
= 1 + z + βne
z (9)
with initial condition z(0) = 0 to define a function z(s) mapping [0, 1] to [0, n]. The constant βn is chosen so
that z(1) = n. Since the differential equation (9) implies
s =
∫ z(s)
0
dz
1 + z + βnez
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for all s > 0 such that z(s) is defined, the boundary condition z(1) = n requires the equation
1 =
∫ n
0
dz
1 + z + βnez
(10)
to be satisfied, and we treat this equation as the definition of βn.
Denoting the cumulative distribution functions of xi and ti by F andG, respectively, we will be analyzing
the oblivious stopping rule which selects the earliest (xi, ti) satisfying
1 − F(xi) < z(G(ti))/n.
We will prove that this rule satisfies a prophet inequality with a specific factor αn to be determined later.
(Equation (26) below defines αn.) Let xτ denote the x-coordinate of the element (xi, ti) selected by the
oblivious stopping rule, and let x∗ denote the random variable max1≤i≤n{xi}. As in the proof of Lemma 6,
we will make use of the equations
Ex∗ =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(x∗ > y) dy, Exτ =
∫ ∞
0
Pr(xτ > y) dy
which reduces the task of proving a prophet inequality with factor αn to the task of proving
∀y αn · Pr(x∗ > y) ≤ Pr(xτ > y).
At this point a couple of observations will slightly simplify the analysis. If we change coordinates to replace
ti with G(ti) this has no effect on the behavior of the stopping rule, and of course if has no effect on x∗, so
we are free to adopt this reparameterization and assume henceforth that ti is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
In particular, this means the stopping rule simplifies to choosing the first (xi, ti) such that 1− F(xi) < z(ti)/n.
The next simplification comes from introducing the variable q = n · (1 − F(y)) and writing the event x∗ > y
in the form 1 − F(x∗) < 1 − F(y) = q/n. The probability of this event is
1 −
n∏
i=1
Pr
(
1 − F(xi) ≥
q
n
)
= 1 −
(
1 −
q
n
)n
.
The function λ 7→
(
1 + λ
n
)n
will be appearing frequently throughout this calculation so we will assign it a
name: expn(λ). (This name is inspired by the fact that expn(λ) → exp(λ) as n → ∞ for any fixed λ, so expn
is a degree-n polynomial approximation to the exponential function.)
We have derived that for q = n · (1 − F(y)),
Pr(x∗ > y) = 1 − expn(−q).
Now what about Pr(xτ > y)? We can calculate this probability by integrating, with respect to t ∈ [0, 1], the
probability that the stopping rule selects a point in (y,∞) × (t, t + dt). In order for (xi, ti) to be this point, the
following things must happen.
1. ti ∈ (t, t + dt). This has probability dt.
2. 1 − F(xi) < z(ti)/n ≈ z(t)/n.
3. 1 − F(xi) < 1 − F(y) = q/n.
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4. None of the points (x j, t j), for j , i, satisfy the stopping condition with t j < ti.
The conjunction of the first three events has probability 1
n
min{z(t), q} dt. Let Z(t) =
∫ t
0
z(u) so that Z(t)/n
is the probability that a specific point (x j, t j) satisfies t j < t along with the stopping condition 1 − F(x j) <
z(t j)/n. The fourth event above has probability (1 − Z(t)/n)
n−1 > expn(−Z(t)). Hence
Pr(xτ > y) >
∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} expn(−Z(t)) dt.
We are left with proving that for a suitable choice of αn, the inequality
αn
(
1 − expn(−q)
)
≤
∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} expn(−Z(t)) dt (11)
holds for all q ∈ [0, n]. At this point a useful identity comes to our aid.
Lemma 7. The functions z and Z defined above satisfy the equation
1
1 + βn
(
1 − e−q − qe−n
)
=
∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} exp(−Z(t)) dt (12)
for every q ∈ [0, n].
Proof. The proof is a brief but fairly opaque calculation using the differential equation (9) that defines the
function z. First, observe that z satisfies the equation z′′(r) = z′(r) · (z′(r)− z(r)) because if one differentiates
both sides of (9) one obtains
z′′(r) = z′(r) + βz′(r)e−z(r) = z′(r) · (1 + βe−z(r)) = z′(r) · (z′(r) − z(r)).
Second, observe that the function h(r) = z′(r) exp(Z(r) − z(r)) is constant: its derivative satisfies
h′(r) = z′′(r) exp(Z(r) − z(r)) + z′(r)(Z′(r) − z′(r)) exp(Z(r) − z(r))
= [z′′(r) − z′(r) · (z′(r) − z(r))] exp(Z(r) − z(r)) = 0.
Since h(0) = z′(0) = 1 + βn, we may conclude that h(r) = 1 + βn for all r, which means
exp(−Z(r)) =
1
1 + βn
z′(r) exp(−z(r)). (13)
Integrating both sides of (13) we obtain
∫ 1
r
exp(−Z(t)) dt =
1
1 + βn
∫ 1
r
exp(−z(t))z′(t) dt
=
1
1 + βn
(
e−z(r) − e−z(1)
)
=
1
1 + βn
(
e−z(r) − e−n
)
. (14)
Let r = z−1(q). The function z(t) is increasing in t, so min{z(t), q} equals z(t) for t ≤ r, and it equals q for
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t > r. Hence,
∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} exp(−Z(t)) dt =
∫ r
0
z(t) exp(−Z(t)) dt + q
∫ 1
r
exp(−Z(t)) dt
= 1 − exp(−Z(r)) + z(r)
∫ 1
r
exp(−Z(t)) dt
= 1 −
(
1
1 + βn
)
z′(r)e−z(r) +
z(r)
1 + βn
(
e−z(r) − e−n
)
=
1 + βn − (z
′(r) − z(r))e−z(r) − z(r)e−n
1 + βn
=
1 + βn − (1 + βne
z(r))e−z(r) − z(r)e−n
1 + βn
=
1 − e−z(r) − z(r)e−n
1 + βn
=
1 − e−q − qe−n
1 + βn
which matches the equation claimed in the lemma statement. 
Compared to the equation (12) asserted by Lemma 7, the inequality (11) that we need to prove differs in
three important respects.
1. The expn function appearing on both sides of (11) has been replaced by the exponential function
in (12).
2. The left side of (12) has an additional qe−n term that does not correspond to any term on the left side
of (11).
3. The constant on the left side of (12) is 1
1+βn
instead of αn. In fact, we will be choosing αn to be
very close to 1
1+βn
, but slightly smaller. The difference between αn and
1
1+βn
will be necessary to
compensate for error terms arising from substituting exp for expn and from the additional qe
−n term
on the left side.
The process of accounting for these differences between (11) and (12) begins with the following technical
lemma that provides an upper bound on the value of Z(r) for 0 ≤ r ≤ 1.
Lemma 8. If n ≥ 3 then Z(r) < 2 for all r ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. First, recall from equation (10) that
∫ n
0
dz
1+z+βnez
= 1. As a function of β, the value of
∫ n
0
dz
1+z+βez
is monotonically decreasing, so the fact that
∫ 3
0
dz
1+z+ez/5
> 1 (as can be verified numerically) implies that
β3 > 1/5. Since βn is increasing in n, this also implies βn > 1/5 for all n ≥ 3.
Now, as Z(r) is increasing in r, to prove the inequality Z(r) < 2 it suffices to show that Z(1) < 2.
Recalling equation (13), we have
eZ(1) =
(1 + βn)e
z(1)
z′(1)
=
(1 + βn)e
n
1 + n + βnen
<
1 + βn
βn
< 6
where the final inequality used the fact that βn > 1/5. Taking the logarithm of both sides, we find that
Z(1) < 2 as desired. 
The next lemma bounds the multiplicative error in using expn(−Z(r)) to approximate exp(−Z(r)).
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Lemma 9. For 0 ≤ λ < 2 and n ≥ 2,(
1 − 2
n
)2
exp(−λ) ≤ expn(−λ) ≤ exp(−λ). (15)
Proof. Recalling the definition of the expn function and using the inquality 1− x ≤ e
−x, we have expn(−λ) =
(1 − λ/n)n ≤ exp(−λ/n)n = exp(−λ) which furnishes the first inequality in the lemma statement. To prove
the second inequality, note that(
1 − 2
n
)−2
expn(−λ) >
(
1 − λ
n
)−2
expn(−λ) =
(
1 − λ
n
)n−2
=
(
1 + λ
n−λ
)2−n
≥ exp
(
−
(
n−2
n−λ
)
λ
)
≥ exp (−λ)
where the first and last inequalities made use of the fact that λ < 2, and the second inequality depends on
the fact that n ≥ 2, so that the exponent 2 − n is non-positive. 
The following simple inequality will be used twice in the sequel.
Lemma 10. For all λ ≥ 0,
λ2 ≤ eλ − 1. (16)
Proof. The function eλ−2λ attains its minimum value at λ = ln(2), where its value is strictly positive. Since
this function is the derivative of eλ − λ2 − 1, we may conclude that the latter function is strictly increasing,
and therefore λ2 ≤ eλ − 1 for all λ ≥ 0. 
Combining the steps above, we can obtain a useful lower bound on the right side of (11).
Lemma 11. For n ≥ 3, ∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} expn(−Z(t)) dt ≥
(
1 − 5
n
) 1
1 + βn
(
1 − e−q
)
. (17)
Proof. Lemma 8 justifies applying Lemma 9 to the factor expn(−Z(t)) in the integrand, which implies∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} expn(−Z(t)) dt ≥
(
1 − 2
n
)2 ∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} exp(−Z(t)) dt
=
(
1 − 2
n
)2 1
1 + βn
(
1 − e−q − qe−n
)
(18)
where the second line is derived from Lemma 7.
Now, the function
q
1−e−q
is an increasing function of q in the range 0 < q < ∞, as can be verified by
computing that the derivative is e−q · (eq − 1 − q) · (1 − e−q)−2 and observing that all three factors are strictly
positive. Hence, for 0 < q < n we have
q
1 − e−q
<
n
1 − e−n
<
en
n
, (19)
where the second inequality makes use of Lemma 10. Rearranging terms in (19) we obtain
qe−n < 1
n
(1 − e−q) (20)
and substituting this into the right side of (18) we obtain∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} expn(−Z(t)) dt ≥
(
1 − 2
n
)2 1
1 + βn
(
1 − e−q
) (
1 − 1
n
)
. (21)
The observation that (1 − 2
n
)2(1 − 1
n
) > (1 − 5
n
) concludes the proof. 
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Next we need a lemma accounting for the discrepancy between the function 1 − expn(−q) appearing on
the left side of (11) and the function 1 − e−q in (17).
Lemma 12. For 0 < q < n, (
1 − 1
n
)
·
(
1 − expn(−q)
)
< 1 − e−q. (22)
Proof. If q ≥ n/2 then expn(−q) < e
−q ≤ e−n/2 < 1
n
, so both 1 − expn(−q) and 1 − e
−q are in the interval[
1 − 1
n
, 1
]
, and the lemma follows easily in this case. Assume henceforth that q < n/2.
For 0 < s < n the inequality ln(1− s
n
) < − s
n
implies that −1− ln(1− s
n
) > −1+ s
n
. Integrating from s = 0
to s = q, we derive
(n − q) ln
(
1 −
q
n
)
> −q +
q2
2n
= −
(
n − q
n
)
q −
q2
2n
. (23)
Multiplying both sides by n
n−q
we obtain
n ln
(
1 −
q
n
)
> −q −
q2
2(n − q)
. (24)
Now exponentiate both sides of (24).
expn(−q) > e
−q exp
(
−
q2
2(n − q)
)
> e−q
[
1 −
q2
2(n − q)
]
1 − expn(−q) < 1 − e
−q +
q2e−q
2(n − q)
< 1 − e−q +
q2e−q
n
(25)
where the final inequality used the fact that q < n/2. Lemma 10 implies that q2e−q < 1 − e−q so
1 − expn(−q) < 1 − e
−q +
1 − e−q
n
= (1 + 1
n
) · (1 − e−q) < (1 − 1
n
)−1 · (1 − e−q)
and the lemma follows upon rearranging terms. 
Combining equation (17) with Lemma 12, we obtain the inequality
(
1 − 1
n
) (
1 − 5
n
)
(1 + βn)
−1 (1 − expn(−q)) <
∫ 1
0
min{z(t), q} expn(−Z(t)) dt
which proves (11) with
αn =
(
1 − 6
n
)
(1 + βn)
−1 (26)
since (1 − 1
n
)(1 − 5
n
) > 1 − 6
n
.
Finally, let us bound the difference between αn and the constant α = 0.745 . . . defined by the equation∫ 1
0
dy
y − y ln y + 1 − 1
α
= 1.
Perform the substitution y = e−z to deduce that∫ ∞
0
dz
1 + z +
(
1
α
− 1
)
ez
.
Set β = 1
α
− 1, which implies α = (1 + β)−1. Noting that∫ n
0
dz
1 + z + βez
<
∫ ∞
0
dz
1 + z + βez
= 1 =
∫ n
0
dz
1 + z + βnez
and that
∫ n
0
dz
1+z+xez
is a monotonically decreasing function of x, we deduce that βn < β which implies
(1 + βn)
−1 > (1 + β)−1 = α. Hence αn >
(
1 − 6
n
)
α.
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B Tightness of bounds
In this section we prove that the bounds in each part of Theorem 4 are tight under their respective assump-
tions.
Proposition 1. For any ε > 0 there exists a joint distribution of the agent’s and principal’s utilities such
that the principal’s expected utility is always less than
(
1
2
+ ε
)
E[x∗] regardless of the choice of mechanism.
Proof. For a parameter H ≫ 1/ε, define the joint distribution of (x, y) to be a mixture of uniform distribu-
tions on two rectangles. The first is the rectangle Q1 = [1 −
1
H
, 1 + 1
H
] × [2, 3], the second is the rectangle
Q2 = [H,H+2]× [0, 1]. The pair (x, y) is drawn from the uniform distribution on Q1 with probability 1−
1
nH
and from the uniform distribution on Q2 with probability
1
nH
. When we draw n i.i.d. samples {(xi, yi)}
n
i=1
from this joint distribution, the random variable max{xi} is uniformly distributed in [1 −
1
H
, 1 + 1
H
] with
probability (1 − 1
nH
)n = 1 − 1
H
+ O(H−2), and it is uniformly distributed in [H,H + 2] with probability
1 − (1 − 1
nH
)n = 1
H
− O(H−2). Therefore, letting x∗ = max{xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n},
Ex∗ = 1 · (1 −
1
nH
)n + (n + 1) · [1 − (1 − 1
nH
)n] = 1 + n ·
(
1
H
− O(H−2)
)
= 2 − O( 1
H
).
Now we bound the principal’s expected utility under any mechanism. By Lemma 1 it is enough to consider
single proposal mechanisms. Let R denote the eligible set of the mechanism, and let p denote the probability
that a random sample from the distribution of (x, y) belongs to Q1∩R. Since the agent prefers every element
of Q1 to every element of Q2, if even one of the n samples belongs to Q1 ∩ R then the agent will propose
an element of Q1 ∩ R. This event E1 happens with probability 1 − (1 − p)
n and the principal’s expected
utility conditional on E1 is bounded above by 1 +
1
H
. The other case in which the principal gets non-zero
utility is if all n samples belong to the complement of Q1 ∩ R, but they don’t all belong to the complement
of Q2 ∪ (Q1 ∩ R). The probability of this event E2 is (1 − p)
n − (1 − p − n−2)n = 1
H
(1 − p)n−1 +O(H−2), and
principal’s expected utility conditional on E2 is bounded above by H + 2. Hence, denoting the principal’s
utility by xˆ,
Exˆ ≤ Pr(E1) ·
(
1 + 1
H
)
+ Pr(E2) · (H + 2)
= [1 − (1 − p)n]
(
1 + 1
H
)
+
[
1
H
(1 − p)n−1 + O(H−2)
]
(H + 2)
= 1 − (1 − p)n + (1 − p)n−1 + O
(
1
H
)
The maximum of (1− p)n + (1− p)n−1 is 1+ 1
n
(1− 1
n
)n−1), achieved at p = 1
n
. Hence, Exˆ = 1+O(1
n
)+O( 1
H
)
which is less than (1
2
+ ε)Ex∗ provided n and H are both sufficiently large. 
The remaining results in this section pertain to the case in which the principal’s and agent’s utilities are
independent random variables.
Proposition 2. For any ε > 0 there exists a product distribution of the agent’s and principal’s utilities
such that the marginal distribution of each party’s utility is atomless, and if the principal cannot observe
the agent’s utility then the principal’s expected utility is always less than
(
1 − 1
e
+ ε
)
E[x∗] regardless of the
choice of mechanism.
Proof. Let Ω = [0, 1] × [0, 1] under the uniform measure. For a sample point (w, z) ∈ Ω we will be defining
the principal’s utility to be x = f (w), where the function f is defined as follows. For some H ≫ 1/ε let f
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map the interval [0, 1 − 1
(e−2)nH
] to [1, 1 + 1
H
] and let f map interval [1 − 1
(e−2)nH
, 1] to [H + 1,H + 1 + 1
H
].
The restriction of f to each of the two subintervals is linear. Thus, the distribution of x is a mixture of two
uniform distributions, on the intervals [1, 1 + 1
H
] and [H + 1,H + 1 + 1
H
], with the mixture weights being
1 − 1
(e−2)nH
and 1
(e−2)nH
, respectively.
By Lemma 1 we can restrict our attention to single proposal mechanisms. Let R denote the eligible set
of the mechanism, and let χR denote its characteristic function.
The agent’s utility y will be defined as a function of both w and z, but with the property that conditional
on the values of w and χR(w, z), the value of y is always uniformly distributed. Such a function y can
be constructed as follows. For w ∈ [0, 1] let Rw denote the intersection of R with {w} × [0, 1]; this set
is measurable for almost every w. If the measure of Rw, m(Rw), belongs to {0, 1}, then y(w, z) = z. If
0 < m(Rw) < 1 then
y(w, z) =

m(Rw∩[0,z])
m(Rw)
if z ∈ Rw
m(Rw∩[0,z])
m(Rw)
if z ∈ Rw.
Let p = 1
(e−2)nH
denote the probability that a random (w, z) satisfies x(w) ≥ H + 1. Let q = m(R) be
the probability that a random sample (w, z) ∈ [0, 1]2 belongs to the eligible set. Conditional on belonging
to the eligible set, a random sample point (w, z) has probability at most p/q of satisfying x(w) ≥ H + 1.
Furthermore, since y(w, z) is independent of both w and χR(w, z), conditional on the set of eligible points
sampled by the agent being non-empty, the conditional distribution of w and χR(w, z) for the agent’s proposal
(assuming best response to the mechanism) is equal to the conditional distribution of a single random sample
(w, z) ∈ [0, 1]2 conditioned on belonging to R. Hence, if xˆ denotes the value of x(w, z) · χR(w, z) when the
agent’s proposal (w, z) is a best response to the mechanism, we have
Exˆ = (1 − (1 − q)n) ·
[
1 +
p
q
· H + O( 1
H
)
]
.
Meanwhile, if x∗ = maxi{xi} then
Ex∗ = 1 + (1 − (1 − p)
n)H + O( 1
H
).
Let q = φ/n. Ignoring O( 1
H
) terms that vanish as H → ∞ and O(1/n) terms that vanish as n →∞ we have
Ex∗ ≈ 1 +
1
(e−2)H
· H = e−1
e−2
Exˆ ≈
(
1 − e−φ
)
·
(
1 + 1
(e−2)φ
)
Exˆ
Ex∗
≈
(
1 − e−φ
)
·
(
e − 2
e − 1
+
1
(e − 1)φ
)
. (27)
The right side of (27) is maximized at φ = 1, where it equals 1 − 1
e
. Thus, for any mechanism that is
obvlivious to the value of y, E[xˆ]/E[x∗] ≤ 1 −
1
e
+ O(1/H) + O(1/n), which is less than 1 − 1
e
+ ε for H and
n sufficiently large. 
Proposition 3. Let α = 0.745 . . . denote the solution to
∫ 1
0
dy
y+y ln y−1/α+1
= 1. For any ε > 0 there exists a
product distribution of the agent’s and principal’s utilities such that the principal’s expected utility is always
less than (α + ε)E[x∗], regardless of the choice of mechanism.
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Proof. The proof is by contradiction. It is known (Hill and Kertz, 1982; Kertz, 1986) that there is no prophet
inequality with factor α + ε for i.i.d. distributions. In other words, there exists a distribution F such that if
x1, . . . , xn and i.i.d. with distribution F, then for every stopping rule τ we have
Exτ < (α + ε)Ex∗. (28)
To prove the proposition we will consider the sample space Ω = R+ × [0, 1], with sample points denoted by
(x, y), under the product distribution where x is distributed according to F and y is uniformly dstributed in
[0, 1]. We will show how to transform any mechanism that guarantees utility at least (α + ε)E[x∗] for the
principal into a stopping rule τ that violates (28), yielding the desired contradiction.
The transformation is simple to describe. If there is a mechanism guaranteeing utility at least (α+ε)E[x∗]
for the principal, we can assume it is a single proposal mechanism by Lemma 1. Let R denote the eligible
set of the mechanism. The stopping rule τ is specified as follows. First, it draws n i.i.d. uniform random
samples from [0, 1] and sorts them into decreasing order, numbering them as y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn. Then the
stopping time τ is defined as the minimum i such that (xi, yi) ∈ R.
Observe that the distribution of the sequence of pairs (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) obtained when running the
stopping rule is identical to the distribution over sequences that one obtains by drawing n i.i.d. samples from
Ω and arranging them in order of decreasing y. This is because the random variables x1, x2, . . . , xn are i.i.d.,
so the distribution of the random sequence x1, . . . , xn is invariant under permutations. Thus, the process of
first pairing xi with yi and then sorting by yi generates the same distribution over sequences of pairs as if one
first sorts y1, . . . , yn and then pairs xi with yi.
Next, observe that when the sequence of pairs (x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn) is drawn as in the preceding para-
graph, both the stopping rule and the agent’s best response to the single proposal mechanism select the pair
(xi, yi) ∈ R with maximum yi, or they select ⊥ if there is no pair (xi, yi) ∈ R. Hence, the principal’s expected
payoff when running the mechanism is equal to Exτ. Our assumption that the mechanism guarantees at least
(α + ε)Ex∗ to the principal thus implies that Exτ ≥ (α + ε)Ex∗, contradicting (28). 
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